Lukashenko revealed details of negotiations, explaining how PMC Wagner rebellion in Russia was stopped
After the ceremony of awarding shoulder straps to senior officers today, the President of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, shared the details of how negotiations were held on June 24th against the background of the PMC Wagner’s attempted armed rebellion, also commenting on the motives of his actions and position, BelTA reports
The event at the Palace of Independence was pre-scheduled, but it was held in an expanded format. The leadership of military and law enforcement agencies, special forces, as well as media executives, political scientists and journalists were invited to participate. The conversation was serious and, importantly, extremely sincere – with answers to the most pressing questions that have been in people’s minds in recent days. Aleksandr Lukashenko also commented on a number of fakes and speculation.
Below is the President’s speech on the matter, with almost no cuts – so that to feel its mood and understand the key points.
On decision to speak on the issue
“Yesterday morning I decided that it was time to say something on this topic (of course, not everything) – doing this honestly, openly, and hiding nothing.
I was inspired by what was [observed] in the media, especially in Russia... Belarusians are great. Openly speaking, I asked the press secretary to contact the leadership of our main media and ask them not to extremely focus on this topic. There is nothing to be happy about, and you will get to know now why I am saying so. In Russia – as always, as it always happens – cheer-patriots emerged. I saw that trend, when they began to scream and cry, to condemn Putin, calling him not to stop criminal cases, to hunt [those involved] down, to put them in prison… This is what I would like to warn us and Russian society against.
In this regard, when that turmoil – as President Putin called it – began developing in Russia, virtually everyone kept the noise down. Matviyenko turned out to be courageous. The same could be said about Volodin, the Patriarch, a couple of more people – and that's it. Actually, after a fight, we all know how to wave our fists, urging to punish. Listen, there are those who need to be punished, and we know where these people are. There are those who should be sent to prison when needed.”
"This prompted me to say a few words about the situation that was developing on Friday and Saturday, because – as you know – I was immersed in the happening events to the full.”
"In order for you to understand, to know and to feel what was happening, and what could have happened, I would like you to know and to understand exactly what took place, and what could have developed."
On how disturbing information was obtained
“Well, it was Friday. You know, we had such a happy day, as we were all preparing to celebrate the alumni’s holiday. Naturally, I was also decently occupied with those issues. Actually, I will be sincere with you: when receiving information from time to time about what is happening in Russia, in Rostov, in the south, I somehow do not pay much attention. The war is going on, and different things may happen there…
However, by 8am on Saturday, I already received alarming information about the situation in Russia. Someone is informing me on what is being posted in these Telegram channels, messengers... Through the Federal Security Service and General Tertel of our State Security Committee I was reported that President Putin wanted to contact me. No problem. We agreed at 9.30am that we would talk at any time convenient for him. He addressed the nation at 10am and called me at 10.10am, informing me in detail about the situation developing in Russia."
"I asked [Putin] a few questions, including about the counteraction to the happening events, and I realised that the situation was complicated. I’d rather not specify that part of our conversation."
On proposal made to Putin not to be in hurry with tough decisions
"The most dangerous point – as I understood that – was not the situation itself, but its possible development and consequences. I also realised that a tough decision was made (it sounded like a subtext in Putin's speech): to destruct. I then proposed Putin not to be in a hurry. I told him, “Let’s contact Prigozhin and his commanders,” and Putin replied, “Listen, Sasha, it is useless. He does not even pick up the phone, he does not want to talk to anyone."
How it became possible to contact Prigozhin
"I asked [Putin], “Where is he?" [The Russian President] replied, “In Rostov." I said, “Okay. A bad peace is better than a good quarrel. Do not rush. I will try to contact him." He once again said, “It is useless." I said, “Okay, wait." Our conversation lasted for about half an hour, and he then informed on how the situation was developing at the front. I remember his words, “You know, oddly enough, it is better than it has ever been at the front now.” I told him, “Well, you see, not everything is so sad." It was 11am, and we needed to find the necessary phone numbers. I asked [Putin], “How can I contact him? Give me the phone number.” He replied, “Most likely, the Federal Security Service has it.” We asked for information and, by the midday, we were reported on three channels that could be used for a talk with Rostov."
"In the midday, we already had the third and fourth round of negotiations through that channel. There were intermediaries in my residence who provided us with that communication."
On role of Yevkurov and Bortnikov in negotiations
"I am thankful to General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov in this regard. We were lucky. He turned out to be a friend of Ivan Stanislavovich [Tertel, KGB Chief]. According to my data, they studied together.
I must say that this general played a very important role. For information, I will tell you: this is the one who – if you remember – went to the airfield in Serbia with a battalion. Do you remember that campaign? He led that battalion. However, those events did not have their continuation – as it always happens – because of betrayal or something else. Even the Russian leadership was very shy to talk about that fact. Actually, I was involved in that situation. He is a very brave man. He was seriously wounded when he worked as a head in Ingushetia. The injury was very serious, and I remember Putin telling me that he had been barely pulled out of the grave. He is a military man, responsible, and he did much as part of those negotiations.
I say this in detail since, after the fight, some are waving their fists – [stating] that certain persons participated in the negotiations... Names were mentioned, but I will not voice them. Except from Yevkurov and FSS Chief Bortnikov, nobody participated in the negotiations at the first stage."
On first conversation with Prigozhin
"At 11am (although Putin warned me that he [Prigozhin] would not pick up the phone), he [Prigozhin] immediately took the call. That is, Yevkurov addressed him, giving him a phone with the words that ‘the President of Belarus is calling’. “Will you talk?” he asked Prigozhin, and the latter replied, “I will talk with Aleksandr Grigorievich."
The conversation was a euphoria. Yevgeny was completely euphoric. During the first thirty-minute round, we were talking exclusively in a dirty language. As I later analysed it, there were ten times more swear words than normal ones. Of course, he apologised and began telling me everything using dirty words.
My thought was how to start the so-called negotiations. The guys just returned from the front, they saw thousands of their soldiers killed. The guys were very offended, especially the commanders. Moreover, as I understood, they produced much influence (I realised that in advance) on Prigozhin himself. Yes, he is a heroic guy actually, but he was pressured and influenced very much by those who led the assault squads and witnessed those deaths. So, I was conducting a dialogue with him in that situation, after he had virtually jumped out of there to Rostov, in such a half-mad state.”
On Wagnerians’ actions in Rostov
"I received information, including from our KGB and military, through my channels that they had occupied the district headquarters [in Rostov].”
“The media immediately covered that as looting, saying that the seizure or something else had taken place. Damaging materials were spread, and especially Ukrainians were savouring that topic.”
I started to clarify, “Did you kill someone there from among civilians, military or those who did not oppose you?” [He replied,] “Aleksandr Grigorievich, I swear to you, we did not touch anyone. We occupied the headquarters, and I am here.” It turned out to be true, and it was very important. Note, it was very important that – after entering Rostov – they did not damage anyone.”
On Prigozhin's demands
“I asked, “What do you want?" (Naturally, I informed Putin about their demands). “I am not asking for anything, Aleksandr Grigorievich. Let them give me Shoigu and Gerasimov. I also need to meet with Putin,” he said. I told him, “Zhenya, no one will give you either Shoigu or Gerasimov, especially in this situation. You know Putin no less than I do. Secondly, he will not meet with you – and he will not even talk to you over the phone – because of this situation." There was silence, and he said, “We want justice! They want to strangle us! We will go to Moscow!" I replied, “Halfway through, they will just crush you like a bug, despite the fact that the troops (Putin told me much about that) were involved at the appropriate front." I advised him to think over that, but he said ‘no’. That was a euphoria.
It took me long to convince him, and I said in the end, “You know, you can do whatever you want, but do not take offense at me. A brigade has been prepared for going to Moscow. We will defend Moscow as in 1941 (you are an educated, intelligent man, and you read books). This is because such a situation is observed not only in Russia, and not because this is our common Fatherland. This is because, God forbid, if this disturbance goes all over Russia (there were great prerequisites for that), we would be next in line.”
"A triumphal march of the Soviet government was the same. About 100 thousand Bolsheviks turned Russia upside down – doing that without weapons. I ask myself: is everything so good here in Russia? Well, no. There are more than enough reasons for this turmoil to go, to roll all over Russia and to reach us. A trigger is needed, and it emerged.”
On inadmissibility of solution by force
"Who is Prigozhin? This is a very authoritative person in the armed forces today – no matter how much someone would dislike it. So I thought: we can destroy him. I also told Putin, “We can destroy.” It is not a problem, [we can do it] either from the first attempt or the second one. I said, “Do not do this.” Otherwise, there will be no negotiations. These guys – who know how to stand up for each other, who fought there, as well as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – will be ready for anything. We can also kill them, but many thousands of civilians and those who will resist the Wagnerians – these men are the most trained unit in the army – will die. Will anyone disagree with that? My military also understand this, and we do not have such [well-prepared] people in Belarus. These are the guys who have gone through more than one war in different places.
Therefore, before destroying, it is necessary to think of what will happen tomorrow. It is important to look beyond a nose, and this especially refers to hooray-screamers who are now promoting this topic.”
On interpersonal conflict
“We will go to Moscow, we need justice. We were fighting honestly. Do you, Aleksandr Grigorievich, know how we fought?” he asked, and I said I knew. As he said, a competition between the army and his company began. That was an unhealthy competition, and an interpersonal conflict between the well-known persons grew into that fight.
In this regard, I would like to make one more remark, why I instructed our media and my press secretary in no case to make a hero out of me, out of Putin or Prigozhin, because we missed that situation. Later, when it began to develop, we thought it would somehow resolve, and this refers to both of us: me and Putin (I am to a lesser extent, to be honest, but still). Actually, it did not resolve by itself, and two people – who fought at the front – virtually collided. I was constantly engaged into that issue, and I know the work of Shoigu. He is sometimes criticised undeservedly. Shoigu visited Belarus more than once. Of course, I cannot fully inform the media on the topics of our discussion. We held very serious negotiations. General Khrenin met with him more than once, and we supported him with everything we could (we could do much), and we did a lot. Shoigu also did a lot in this respect. That is, he has taken a niche in which he can do something.”
"As regards Yevgeny Prigozhin, he can be understood in this sense. Taking into account the fact that he is the same as Shoigu (they have the same characters), that he is very impulsive, everything began.”
On condition for Prigozhin and on his refusal of demands
"When talking for the second or third time, I warned him. I already saw that he was ready to give up, but I warned him, “Yevgeny, no bloodshed. As soon as you intentionally or unintentionally kill at least one person, especially a civilian, there will be no negotiations with you, and I will not talk to you." He swore to me. He said they did not have such a goal. “I swear to you that it will not happen,” he told me.
Negotiations continued throughout the day. There were six or seven rounds of them. I voiced my position, and I did not call him anymore. He contacted me, as far as I remember, six times. He asked for a piece of advice, made suggestions, and so on. When he phoned and said ‘Aleksandr Grigorievich, I will not demand Shoigu and Gerasimov from the President, I will not even ask for a meeting’, I told him, “Well, that's good. This is a very good step. It is no need in the existing circumstances to strain the situation and demand the impossible."
I said, “Just imagine: I am the President, and you are my Defence Minister. And here is a bandit..." “I am not a bandit,” he responded. I continued, “I say as an example: a bandit demands to give Khrenin and Gulevich to him. I will never do that. I will die myself, but I will not do this.” “I understand,” he said, and I told him, “If you understand, then let's act." He asked what should be done, and I answered, “The column’s procession should be stopped.” That is, he agreed to negotiate."
On Belarusian President’s guarantees
"The last argument was when he said at some point after the first negotiations, “Let me gather the commanders and consult." I replied, “Of course, you should consult with them so that you won't be accused later."
We talked at 11am, and he called me after 4pm, “Aleksandr Grigorievich, I accept all your conditions – but what should I do? They will start destroying us if we stop.” I told him, “They will not. I guarantee this, I will take care of that." We were in contact with the Russian leadership, the FSS and Bortnikov dealt mainly with that issue. I just strongly asked not to do that. Bortnikov is a smart man, he said, “Aleksandr Grigorievich, I am not so stupid, I understand what can happen.”
"If they stop somewhere, then the column will shrink and pile up… To avoid, you know, the desire and temptation to attack it, we promised that this will not happen. I told Prigozhin, “This is a guarantee.” "What's next?" he asked, and I said, “Up to the point that I will take you to Belarus and guarantee you and your guys who have come with this column here complete safety.” “Well, I believe you. I believe,” he said. “Well, we will act in this direction,” I responded.
On the end of negotiations and Putin's promise
“We reached the end of the negotiations by the evening. I was in a hurry, because I knew that a line of defence had already been built 200km from Moscow; Bortnikov had informed me on that. Everything was gathered (Putin told me about that in the evening) – as during the war years. Cadets [were attracted], and the police was prepared in reserve (1,500 men). In short, they gathered quite many forces in the Kremlin and near it. I think there were around ten thousand defenders. I was afraid that if the Wagnerians ran into them on that line (it was just about 200km to Moscow), blood would be shed, and this will be the end.
I told [Prigozhin], “Well, Bortnikov will oversee this. You need to contact him.” “He's not picking up the phone,” [Prigozhin] said, and I responded, “He will take it. Call him in 20 minutes." I asked Ivan Stanislavovich [Tertel, KGB Chief] to urgently find Bortnikov and ask him to call me. He called, and I said, “Aleksandr Vasilievich, pick up the phone if Prigozhin calls you." Of course, he was seething with emotions. I said, “Listen, put everything aside and do as we have agreed with him." They talked. He [Prigozhin] turned the column around, and they went to their camps in the Lugansk Region. They went to the camps.
I talked to Putin in the evening, and I asked him again, “In no case…” “Yes. Good. I will do everything that has been promised,” [he said], and he did.
The turmoil was thus prevented, and dangerous events that could have developed were removed. The security guarantees, as he said, promised yesterday, have been provided."
